Items of a homogeneous commodity are often sold simultaneously in different selling mechanisms. As such, (online) auctioneers find themselves competing against one another to attract bidders. This paper theoretically investigates the revenue ranking of competing first price and second price auctions while allowing for endogenous entry by homogeneously risk averse bidders. In doing so, we consider an auction selection game in which two items of a commodity are offered simultaneously. Both items may be offered by a single auctioneer or by two competing auctioneers each offering one item. First, each seller selects a first price or second price auction. Next, bidders learn which auctions have been selected and subsequently enter one of these auctions. We find that a symmetric entry equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and is unique, and that the corresponding entry probability crucially depends on bidders' degree of absolute risk aversion. We further find that, independent of the degree of absolute risk aversion, the auctions' joint revenue is maximized when both items are sold in first price auctions. Sellers in a duopoly have a dominant strategy to select first price auctions when bidders exhibit constant or increasing absolute risk aversion, but the existence of other equilibria cannot be ruled out when bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Introduction
Traditionally, the economics literature on auctions has focused on the seller's perspective, studying how auctioneers can maximize revenues. The celebrated revenue ranking theorems (Vickrey, 1961; Milgrom and Weber, 1982) and optimal auction theorems (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Maskin and Riley, 1984) are perfect examples of this. As a result, auction theory is one of the areas in game theory most successful in finding direct applications; an accomplishment that is best illustrated by the leading role auction theorists have played in designing real-world auctions.
Nowadays, a single commodity is often sold through multiple channels. On the Internet, for instance, consumers may buy a commodity at a fixed price but may also participate in one of many online auctions. These selling mechanisms may be offered by different sellers, but recently some sellers have also started offering a single commodity through multiple selling mechanisms at the same time. A Dutch travel agency 1 , for instance, sells holidays through ascending auctions, next to selling them at a fixed price. In the United Kingdom, one company 2 offers its customers two auction mechanisms from which they may choose: first price auctions and lowest unique bid auctions. The existence of such diversity in selling mechanisms allows consumers to choose not only from which seller, but even through which type of selling mechanism to buy. Auctioneers now find themselves competing against one another to attract bidders.
In light of these developments, traditional revenue ranking theorems (in which the number of bidders are taken as given) may no longer apply. An auction that in isolation generates the highest revenue, may no longer do so if bidders have no incentive to enter this auction. Therefore, when deciding which auction to use, sellers should take into account bidders' entry decisions. A seller in a duopoly, for instance, should take into account which auction is offered by his competitor, as this will affect the number of bidders his own auction will attract. In a similar way, a monopolist who sells two items of a homogeneous commodity simultaneously, should take into account how the auctions he offers affect bidders' entry incentives. This paper studies competing auctions. We theoretically investigate which auctions-first price (FPA) or second price auctions (SPA)-are selected by revenue-maximizing sellers when allowing for endogenous entry. As a first step, we consider bidders who are either risk neutral or homogeneously risk averse.
To model auction selection and endogenous entry into auctions, we consider a three-stage game in which two items of a homogenous commodity are offered to a group of N potential bidders. At Stage 1, each seller selects an auction: first price auction (FPA) or second price auction (SPA). In this stage, we both consider a revenue-maximizing monopolistic auctioneer simultaneously selling two items of a homogeneous commodity, as well as two competing auctioneers each offering one item simultaneously. At Stage 2, each bidder learns which auctions have been selected and subsequently enters into one of the auctions. At Stage 3, the auctions are conducted. Applying backward induction, we expand on existing results on bidding strategies and bidder preferences among auctions to study the entry decisions by bidders in Stage 2. These results, in turn, are used as input for the auction selection by sellers in Stage 1.
Our findings show that when bidders may choose between entering the FPA and the SPA, bidders enter both auctions with equal probability if they are risk neutral or exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). If bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), however, more bidders will enter the SPA, whereas if bidders exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), more bidders will enter the FPA. Using these results, we further find that a monopolist prefers to sell both items in two simultaneous FPAs. Likewise, when bidders exhibit CARA or IARA, both sellers in a duopoly have a dominant strategy to select FPA. We demonstrate by example that the same is true when bidders exhibit DARA and values are uniformly distributed, but in general cannot rule out the existence of other equilibria.
Our study is related to the literature on bidder preferences and entry into auctions. Matthews (1987) was the first to take into account the bidder's point of view. In doing so, he compares auctions for risk averse bidders, where the number of bidders is fixed. On the one hand, risk averse bidders tend to overbid in FPA, but not in SPA, which makes SPA more desirable. But at the same time, the payment in SPA is a random variable, whereas the payment in FPA is not. Matthews (1987) finds that a bidder prefers the SPA to the FPA if she exhibits DARA. Conversely, if she exhibits IARA, she will prefer the FPA. In case the bidder exhibits CARA, she will be indifferent between the two auctions. The first attempt to endogenize the number of bidders in auctions was performed by Levin and Smith (1994) , who modeled a bidder's decision between entering and not entering an auction (or equivalently between entering an auction or an outside option) with risk neutral bidders. They theoretically show that there is a symmetric entry equilibrium involving mixed strategies. Their work was later extended by Smith and Levin (1996) for homogeneously risk averse bidders and by Pevnitskaya (2004) for heterogeneously risk averse bidders.
Another study closely related to ours is that of Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004) , who theoretically investigate auction selection with bidders who exhibit constant absolute risk attitudes. They find that when bidders are constant absolute risk averse, sellers prefer to select a FPA. When bidders are constant absolute risk seeking, however, sellers will be better off by selecting a k-price auction of higher order. In their paper, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004) follow McAfee and McMillan (1987) by assuming exogenous random participation of bidders. Our paper extends this work by considering endogenous entry and by including a wider range of risk attitudes.
Our study extends the existing literature in two ways. First, by allowing for endogenous entry, we are better able to compare the profitability of different auctions and thereby add to existing revenue ranking theorems. Second, this paper extends models of endogenous entry into auctions by allowing bidders to choose not simply between entering an auction or not, but between entering one auction versus an alternative auction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail. Section 3 analyzes the entry decisions in Stage 2 of our three-stage game and Section 4 analyzes the auction selection in Stage 1. Finally, Section 5 discusses some extensions of our model, and Section 6 discusses our findings and provides concluding remarks.
The model
Suppose that two items of a homogeneous commodity are offered simultaneously to a group of N potential bidders. The seller (he) or sellers-both items might be owned by a single seller or by two different sellers-may choose to offer these items in a first price auction (FPA) or in a second price auction (SPA). Consider the following three-stage game, which to a large extent follows the models of endogenous entry in IPV auctions of Levin and Smith (1994) , Smith and Levin (1996) and Pevnitskaya (2004) .
At Stage 1, the seller of item i = 1, 2 selects an auction a in which he offers this item, where a may be FPA or SPA. Assume that sellers are risk neutral and have zero valuation for the commodity. At this stage, both N and the distribution of values F(v)-a continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function with support [v, v] -are common knowledge.
Prior to Stage 2, the N potential bidders learn a i . That is, they learn which auctions have been selected by the seller(s). Subsequently, each of the N potential bidders enters one of the auctions: n 1 actual bidders enter the auction for item 1 (a 1 ) and n 2 = N − n 1 actual bidders enter the auction for item 2 (a 2 ).
At Stage 3, the auctions are conducted. Prior to this stage each bidder (she) learns n i and receives an independent private value drawn randomly from a common distribution F(v). In the auctions, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids according to the unique, symmetric and increasing Nash equilibrium bidding function (b(v|n i , a i )). The outcome of the auctions is to allocate the items to the highest bidders. Whereas in the FPA the winner pays her own bid, in the SPA the winner pays the bid of the second highest bidder.
Throughout the paper we assume that bidders are symmetric and homogeneous. More specifically, we assume that bidders maximize the same twice continuously differentiable utility function U(·, r) with support [0, r], which satisfies U (·, r) > 0 and U (·, r) ≤ 0, and where r is a risk parameter equal to the absolute rate of risk aversion (ARA) measured by − U U . Notice that as r → 0, − U U → 0 and, hence, r = 0 corresponds to risk neutrality.
The outcomes of Stage 3 have been extensively analyzed in the literature (e.g. Vickrey (1961 ), Holt Jr (1980 and Maskin and Riley (1984) ). Applying backward induction, we use these outcomes to analyze the entry decisions in Stage 2 and subsequently the selection of auctions in Stage 1.
Endogenous entry
In Section 3, we analyze Stage 2 of our three-stage game in which bidders enter one of the auctions. Following Levin and Smith (1994) , let E[U(π|n i , a i )] denote each potential entrant's ex ante expected gain from entering, learning n i and bidding according to the symmetric Nash strategy implied by n i and a i . As bidders are assumed to be symmetric, we follow Levin and Smith (1994) , Smith and Levin (1996) and Pevnitskaya (2004) in focussing on a symmetric entry equilibrium involving mixed strategies: each potential bidder enters a 1 with probability q, and enters a 2 with probability 1 − q.
A symmetric entry equilibrium must yield the same probability of entry for all potential bidders. For q * ∈ (0, 1) to constitute a mixed-strategy equilibrium, each potential entrant must be indifferent between entering a 1 or a 2 . This implies that the equilibrium is described by the following:
(1) where the terms in the brackets give the binomial probability that exactly n i − 1 rivals also enter the mechanism, giving n i in total.
The value q * that satisfies (1) characterizes equilibrium in mixed strategies. We can show that this equilibrium is unique for a given r. Lemma 1. The equilibrium probability of entry, q * , exists and is unique for a given r.
Proof. Let (1) be rewritten as follows:
where p n 1 −1:N−1 = (
By Lemma A1 (see appendix) E[U(q, r, a 1 )] is continuous and monotonically decreasing in q, and by Lemma A2 (see appendix) E[U(q, r, a 1 )] is continuous and monotonically increasing in q. Then it follows that the function z(q, r) = E[U(q, r, a 1 )] − E[U(q, r, a 2 )] must be continuous and monotonically decreasing in q as well.
Notice that to achieve equilibrium, it must be true that z(q * , r) = 0. We may now distinguish three cases:
. If the probability of entering a 1 is zero, then a bidder can receive a positive payoff with certainty by entering a 1 . 2. q * = 1: Then z(1, r) ≤ 0, meaning that E[U(1, r, a 1 )] ≤ E[U(0, r, a 2 )]. If the probability of entering a 1 is one, then a bidder can receive a positive payoff with certainty by entering a 2 . 3. 0 < q * < 1: This is the interior case, which results in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
As z(q, r) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in q, by the intermediate value theorem there exists a unique equilibrium q * , and it is defined by (1) in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
The following intuition explains this property. Suppose that all bidders enter a 1 . Then each bidder has an incentive to switch to a 2 : in this auction she will be the only bidder and, hence, earn a positive payoff with certainty. Vice versa if all bidders enter a 2 . Therefore, the resulting equilibrium will be one in mixed strategies, is unique and is defined by (1). The number of actual bidders in a 1 follows a binomial distribution with mean q * N = n 1 and variance (1 − q * )n 1 . Similarly, the number of actual bidders in a 2 follows a binomial distribution with mean (1 − q * )N = n 2 and and variance (q * )n 2 .
As the equilibrium probability of entry q * exists and is unique, we can now determine the value of q * under different circumstances. In doing so, we make heavy use of existing utility equivalence theorems (e.g. Myerson (1981) ; Matthews (1987) ).
Lemma 2. Suppose that a 1 = a 2 and r ≥ 0. Alternatively, suppose that a 1 = a 2 and r = 0, such that bidders are risk neutral. In both cases it follows that bidders randomize over a 1 and a 2 . That is, the equilibrium probability of entry is q * = 0.5.
Proof. Let a 1 = a 2 and r ≥ 0. Then for fixed n i , meaning that n 1 = n 2 , it follows that
. Similarly, let a 1 = a 2 and r = 0. From the utility equivalence principle that follows from Myerson (1981) we know that, for fixed
As a result, each bidder's entry decision is only affected by the number of competing bidders in each auction. This leads bidders to randomize over auctions, that is, q * = 0.5.
When both items are sold in FPA or, equivalently, in SPA, then the expected utility of a 1 and a 2 is equal for fixed n i . This then means that bidders will be indifferent between entering a 1 and a 2 as long as n 1 = n 2 , that is, if bidders enter each auction with equal probability. The same holds for risk neutral bidders who choose to enter an FPA or SPA. Now assume that each item is offered in a different auction. That is, assume that item 1 is offered in FPA and item 2 is offered in SPA. 3 How many bidders choose to enter each auction? We can show that this depends on whether bidders exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA, − U U = 0), decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA, − U U < 0) or increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA, − U U > 0). Proposition 1. Suppose that item 1 is offered in a FPA (a 1 = FPA) and item 2 is offered in a SPA (a 2 = SPA), such that a 1 = a 2 . Further suppose that r > 0. Then the equilibrium probability of entry q * is:
Where q * defines the equilibrium probability of entry into the FPA and 1 − q * defines the equilibrium probability of entry into the SPA.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 consists of two steps. In Step 1, we make use of the utility equivalence results from Matthews (1987) to show that if each auction is entered with equal probability (q = 0.5) then z(q, r) is equal to (smaller than) (larger than) zero in case of CARA (DARA) (IARA). In Step 2 of the proof, we let q adjust such that it reaches equilibrium.
Step 1: Suppose that r > 0 and thatq = 0.5. Then from Matthews (1987) (p.638) it follows that, for fixed n i , the following holds.
Matthews (1987) finds that bidders are indifferent between FPA and SPA when they exhibit CARA. When bidders exhibit DARA, however, they prefer the SPA and when they exhibit IARA they prefer the FPA. This implies that, for a givenq = 0.5, in (1) the LHS is equal to (smaller than) (larger than) the RHS in case of CARA (DARA) (IARA). In other words,
Step 2: Proposition 1 (i) is proved similar to the way Lemma 2 is proved. What follows here is a proof of (ii). By Lemma A1 the LHS of (1) is decreasing in q, whereas by Lemma A2 the RHS of (1) is increasing in q. Since in case of DARA E[U(π|n 1 , FPA)] < E[U(π|n 2 , SPA)] forq = 0.5, it therefore follows that q * needs to decrease in order to achieve equilibrium. As a result, q * < 0.5 and 1 − q * > 0.5 when bidders exhibit DARA (ii). (iii) is proved similarly.
Proposition 1 states that if bidders exhibit CARA, they will enter each auction, FPA and SPA, with equal probability. If bidder exhibit DARA, however, more of them will enter the SPA. This is due to the fact that, for fixed n i , bidders prefer the SPA and more bidders need to enter the SPA in order for each bidder to be indifferent between the FPA and SPA. If bidders exhibit IARA, they prefer to FPA for fixed n i and therefore in equilibrium more bidders enter the FPA.
Simulations with utility functions exhibiting hyperbolic absolute risk aversion confirm Proposition 1 and additionally show that q * remains close to 0.5 for any r. It seems that even though bidders may highly prefer one auction over the other, there are negative externalities from other bidders entering the auction. This latter effect seems to be rather strong, causing q * to remain close to 0.5 even in cases of strong risk aversion.
From Proposition 1 we can infer that there exists a range of risk parameters r, such that the equilibrium probability of entry q * is constant in r when bidders exhibit CARA, is decreasing in r when bidders exhibit DARA, and is increasing in r when bidders exhibit IARA. Corollary 1. Suppose that item 1 is offered in a FPA (a 1 = FPA) and item 2 is offered in a SPA (a 2 = SPA), such that a 1 = a 2 . Then a range of risk parameters r ∈ (0, r * ] exist such that
where, again, q defines the probability of entry into the FPA and 1 − q defines the probability of entry into the SPA.
Proof. This proof again consists of two steps. In Step 1, we show that by Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 z(q, r) is constant (decreasing) (increasing) in r when bidders exhibit CARA (DARA) (IARA). In Step 2 of the proof, we find the derivative of q with respect to r, and show that q is constant (decreasing) (increasing) in r when bidders exhibit CARA (DARA) (IARA).
Step 1: Suppose that a 1 = FPA and that a 2 = FPA, such that a 1 = a 2 . Also suppose that r = 0. Then by utility equivalence, we know that E[U(π|n 1 , FPA)] = E[U(π|n 2 , SPA)], which implies that z(q, r) = 0 forq = 0.5. Similarly, suppose that r > 0. Then we know from Matthews (1987) 
when bidders exhibit DARA and E[U(π|n 1 , FPA)] > E[U(π|n 2 , SPA)] when bidders exhibit IARA. This implies that, for r > 0 andq = 0.5, z(q, r) = 0 when bidders exhibit CARA, z(q, r) < 0 when bidders exhibit DARA and z(q, r) > 0 when bidders exhibit IARA.
Then it follows that, by continuity, there exists a risk parameter r ∈ (0, r * ] such that for a given q
(ii) In case of DARA ∂z(q,r) ∂r
Step 2: Let us show that there exists a range of r ∈ (0, r * ] such that q as defined by (1) is constant (increasing) (decreasing) when bidders exhibit CARA (DARA) (IARA).
By Lemma A3
∂z(q,r) ∂q < 0 for a given r. Since by Step 1 of this proof there is a range of r such that
is constant (decreasing) (increasing) in r when bidders exhibit CARA (DARA) (IARA), it follows that q is constant (decreasing) (increasing) in r when bidders exhibit CARA (DARA) (IARA).
This implies that there exists a range of risk parameters r around risk neutrality, such that q * is constant in r when bidders exhibit CARA, is decreasing in r when bidders exhibit DARA, and is increasing in r when bidders exhibit IARA. We will make heavy use of this result in Section 4, where we analyze Stage 1 of our three-stage game.
Auction selection
In Section 4, we use the outcomes of Section 3 to evaluate the sellers' decision in Stage 1 of our game. In order to do so, we derive expected revenue, in which we assume that item 1 is offered in FPA and item 2 is offered in SPA.
where B FPA (n 1 , r) is the expected bid revenue received by the seller under FPA when there are n 1 entrants and r. It represents the expected payment made by the highest of n 1 bidders. Similarly, B SPA (n 2 ) is the expected bid revenue received by the seller under SPA when there are n 2 entrants.
The revenue equivalence theorem states that for risk neutral bidders and fixed n i , the expected revenue from the FPA equals that of the SPA (Vickrey, 1961) , that is, B FPA (n 1 , 0) = B SPA (n 2 ). When bidders are risk averse, however, bidders tend to overbid in FPA, whereas SPA is insensitive to risk attitudes (Maskin and Riley, 1984) . Therefore, with risk averse bidders, the expected revenue of FPA will be larger than that of SPA. That is, B FPA (n 1 , r) > B SPA (n 2 ) for r > 0. Given our results from Section 3, we can show that when item 1 is offered in FPA and item 2 is offered in SPA, the expected revenue of FPA will be higher than that of SPA when bidders exhibit CARA or IARA.
Lemma 3. Given CARA or IARA bidders, the expected revenue of FPA will be greater than that of SPA.
Proof. For CARA and IARA bidders, Proposition 1 shows that q * ≥ 0.5. This permits direct comparison of expected revenues.
The strict inequality is based on the fact that B FPA (n 1 , r) > B SPA (n 2 ) for n 1 = n 2 and r > 0. To prove that the second inequality holds let revenues be rewritten as
and
where p n 1 :N = (
By Lemma A3 (see appendix) R FPA is continuous and monotonically increasing in q, and by Lemma A4 (see appendix) R SPA is continuous and monotonically decreasing in q. As p n 1 :N = p n 2 :N for q = 0.5, it then follows that p n 1 :N > p n 2 :N when q > 0.5 and p n 1 :N < p n 2 :N when q < 0.5. Since q * ≥ 0.5 and B SPA (n 2 ) is nondecreasing in n 2 , the second inequality must hold. Hence, when bidders have CARA or IARA utility preferences, the traditional revenue ranking of FPA over SPA is sustained.
Lemma 3 also implies that DARA is a necessary condition for the expected revenue of SPA to be greater than that of FPA. Even though B FPA (n 1 , r) > B SPA (n 2 ) for n 1 = n 2 and r > 0, the second inequality in the proof of Lemma 3 may reverse as q * becomes sufficiently small.
The expected revenues from a 1 and a 2 may be represented by the following game. 
where i = 1, 2 and q * = 0.5 follows from Lemma 2. The matrix only lists the payoffs for a 1 ; the payoffs for a 2 are symmetric.
We next analyze the auction selection problem in a monopoly setting (Section 4.1) and in a duopoly setting (Section 4.2).
Monopoly
Consider a monopolist who has two items of a homogeneous commodity for sale, and decides to offer them in two simultaneous auctions: two FPAs, two SPAs, or one FPA and one SPA. The monopolist's objective is to maximize the joint expected revenues from the strategies listed in Table 1 .
Proposition 2.
There exists a risk parameter r * such that for all r ∈ (0, r * ], a monopolist prefers to offer both items in FPAs, rather than to offer one item in FPA and the other in SPA, or to offer both items in SPAs.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 consists of two steps. In Step 1, we first show that a monopolist prefers to offer two FPAs to offering two SPAs. In Step 2, we proceed to show that a monopolist also prefers offering two FPA to offering a FPA and a SPA.
Step 1: By Lemma 2, if two identical auctions are offered bidders will enter each auction with equal probability, that is, q * = 0.5. Combining this with the revenue ranking result for fixed n i from Maskin and Riley (1984) , it follows that the expected revenue of two FPAs is also higher than that of two SPAs when bidders are risk averse.
Step 2: Now it suffices to show that offering two FPAs is better than offering both a FPA and a SPA. The expected revenue for a monopolist when offering FPA and SPA simultaneously is given by:
The expected revenue for a monopolist when offering two FPAs is given by:
where by Lemma 2 q * = 0.5. Proof by contradiction: Suppose that offering two FPAs is not better than offering a FPA and SPA simultaneously. Then the following should be true.
In other words, we must show that (R FPA + R SPA ) ≥ (R FPA + R FPA ). Since by the revenue equivalence theorem B FPA (n 1 , 0) = B SPA (n 2 ) for fixed n i and by Lemma 2 q * = 0.5 when r = 0, we know that (R FPA + R SPA ) = (R FPA + R FPA ) at r = 0. Therefore, to prove (3) it suffices to show that at r = 0 the marginal benefit of (R FPA + R SPA ) − (R FPA + R FPA ) is nonnegative. That is,
The marginal benefit of (3) is given by:
This can be simplified by combining the first and third term.
Then, in the first term, the term in square brackets is equal to zero and, hence, the first term is equal to zero as well, which leaves us with the following.
N n 2 0.5 n 2 0.5
We now evaluate this at r = 0, which by Lemma 2 implies q * = 0.5.
Then the term in square brackets is equal to zero and, hence, the first term is equal to zero as well. This leaves us with the following.
which is a contradiction, as ∂B 1 (n 2 ,r) ∂r > 0 and therefore the RHS is strictly negative. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 states that, for some range of r around risk neutrality, a monopolist prefers to offer each item in a FPA rather than offering them in different auctions or in SPAs. This result is independent of whether bidders exhibit CARA, DARA or IARA. In case of CARA, however, we can show that r * = r.
Corollary 2. When bidders exhibit CARA Proposition 2 holds for the complete range of risk parameters r ∈ (0, r].
Proof. By Proposition 1 we know that with CARA bidders for every r, q * = 0.5. By substituting this into (3), it is immediately clear that the first term of (3) becomes equal to zero. Then it follows that for (3) to be true, the following must be true:
which is a contradiction as for r > 0, B FPA (n 1 , r) > B SPA (n 2 ).
Simulations with utility functions exhibiting hyperbolic absolute risk aversion confirm Proposition 2 and additionally show that it holds for the complete range of risk parameters r ∈ (0, r] even in case of DARA and IARA.
Duopoly
Now consider two sellers who each sell one unit of a homogeneous commodity, where Seller i is the seller offering item i = 1, 2 and each seller can select either FPA or SPA. From Table 1 Following from the revenue ranking by Maskin and Riley (1984) , the strategy combination (FPA, FPA) dominates (SPA, SPA) in terms of payoffs. The ranking of the other strategy combinations is influenced by the degree of absolute risk aversion. We can show that which of these situations arises depends on the value of the equilibrium probability of entry q * .
Lemma 4. When two sellers in a duopoly choose to offer either FPA or SPA, the pure strategy Nash equilibria that emerge are I (FPA, FPA) for any q * > q, q II (SPA, SPA) for any q * < q, q III (FPA, FPA) and (SPA, SPA) for any q < q * < q IV (FPA, SPA) and (SPA, FPA) for any q < q * < q Where q * defines the equilibrium probability of entry into the FPA and 1 − q * defines the equilibrium probability of entry into the SPA, and where q, q < 0.5.
Proof. This proof is based on mutual best responses. By Lemma 3 R FPA is greater than R SPA for r > 0 and any q * ≥ 0.5. However, if q * < 0.5 R FPA may become smaller than R SPA , at least as long as q * is small enough to counteract the effect of B FPA (n i , r) > B SPA (n i ) for r > 0. Let q be defined as the equilibrium probability of entry for which Seller 1 would be indifferent between FPA and SPA given that Seller 2 offers FPA.
where q < 0.5. Similarly, let q be defined as the equilibrium probability of entry for which Seller 1 would be indifferent between FPA and SPA given that Seller 2 offers SPA.
where q < 0.5. Parts I-IV of Lemma 4 follow immediately.
Lemma 4 gives rise to the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that bidders exhibit CARA or IARA. Then each seller in a duopoly has a dominant strategy to select FPA.
Proof. As by Proposition 1 q * ≥ 0.5 when bidders exhibit CARA or IARA, Proposition 3 directly follows from Lemma 4.
Proposition 3 implies that DARA is a necessary condition for any equilibrium other than (FPA, FPA) to exist, but by itself is not sufficient. We demonstrate by example that, when bidders exhibit DARA and values are uniformly distributed, each seller in a duopoly will still have a dominant strategy to offer FPA. However, we cannot rule out the existence of any of the other equilibria.
Duopoly outcomes with DARA bidders
Consider the following example, in which values are uniformly distributed between [0, v] and bidders maximize the same utility function U = y (1−r) , where y represents a bidder's payoff and r ∈ [0, 1) represents the constant relative risk aversion coefficient (see Appendix B for more information). Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the equilibrium probability of entry q * when there are four potential bidders and v = 10.
The numbered regions in Figure 1 correspond to the situations from Lemma 3. Figure 1 shows that for any risk parameter r > 0, q * always remains above q, implying that (FPA, FPA) is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This result is robust for any number of bidders and for a wide range of utility functions exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion.
An equilibrium probability of entry close to 0.5 may result from the negative externalities caused by other bidders entering the auction. Even though bidders may have a clear preference for SPA when they exhibit CRRA and n 1 = n 2 , their entry decisions will mainly be influenced by the number of competitors they may face in the auctions. Additionally, consider a situation in which bidders have an extreme preference for the SPA. Following Maskin and Riley (1984) and Matthews (1987) , this occurs when U is extremely convex. However, such extreme DARA also requires that some bidders are extremely risk averse. The presence of such extreme risk aversion leads to a large difference between the ex ante bid revenue from the FPA and the SPA. As a result, even with a small number of bidders the FPA may generate more revenue than the SPA, and sellers in a duopoly will have a dominant strategy to offer FPA. 
Extensions
Our results can easily be extended to a situation with more than two sellers and to bidders with heterogeneous risk preferences.
First, consider monopolistic competition with M ≥ 2 sellers. From Lemma 2 it immediately follows that if all sellers offer the same auction or if bidders are risk neutral, each bidder enters each auction i = 1, 2, ..., M with probability q * i = 1/M. Now suppose that Seller 1 offers SPA and all other M − 1 Sellers offer FPA, and that bidders are risk averse. Then by Proposition 1 it follows that when bidders exhibit CARA the equilibrium probability of entry equals q * i = 1/M. When bidders exhibit DARA q * 1 > 1/M and q * −1 < 1/M, and when bidders exhibit IARA q * 1 < 1/M and q * −1 > 1/M. In the auction selection stage, offering FPA will remain the equilibrium strategy in both a monopoly and oligopoly setting.
Second, we can interpret the mixed equilibrium of the entry decision stage as a perturbed pure strategy equilibrium if bidders are heterogeneous (Harsanyi purification). Since it is the most empirically relevant assumption, we focus here on DARA, but the same analysis can be done with bidders exhibiting CARA or IARA. Suppose that all bidders have the same utility function exhibiting DARA, but have a different risk parameter r i which is independently drawn from a distribution function G(r) with support (0, r * ], where r * is defined by Corollary 1. Before entry, each bidder knows her own risk parameter and the distribution of other risk parameters G(r). By the Harsanyi purification theorem, there exists a game such that each player has a pure strategy equilibrium to choose either SPA or FPA. Following Pevnitskaya (2004), we can describe the entry equilibrium by the following:
Suppose that a 1 = FPA and a 2 = SPA. Since dq dr < 0 for any r ∈ (0, r * ] when bidders are homogeneous and exhibit DARA, there exists some cut-off risk parameter R such that for bidders with r i < R the LHS of Equation 6 is larger than the RHS, implying that they enter the FPA. Similarly, for bidders with r i > R the LHS of Equation 6 is smaller than the RHS, implying that they enter the SPA. Hence, when bidders exhibit DARA the more risk tolerant bidders will enter the FPA and the more risk averse bidders will enter the SPA. The exact value of R is not easily found, but we do know that it is influenced by the number of bidders in each auction n i . We hypothesize that G(R) ≈ 1 − G(R), such that bidders spread (somewhat) evenly over auctions. This conjecture requires further investigation.
The effects of bidder heterogeneity on the auction selection stage are not immediately clear. The expected revenues of the auctions can be described by:
If it is indeed true that G(R) ≈ 1 − G(R), then by B FPA (n 1 , r i ) > B SPA (n 2 ) for any r i > 0, it must be true that R FPA > R SPA . We therefore end with the conjecture that FPA will remain the dominant strategy in both a monopoly and duopoly setting. This conjecture, however, also requires further investigation.
Conclusion
This study investigates which auctions-FPA or SPA-will be selected by revenue-maximizing sellers when allowing for endogenous entry by risk neutral and risk averse bidders. In doing so, we consider a three-stage game in which two items of a homogenous commodity are offered simultaneously to a group of N potential bidders. At Stage 1, the seller or sellers-we consider a monopoly as well as duopoly settingeach select an auction. At Stage 2, each bidder learns which auctions have been selected, and decides to enter one of the auctions. Finally, at Stage 3, the auctions are conducted. Applying backward induction, we use the outcomes from Stage 3 to study the entry decisions by bidders in Stage 2, and subsequently the selection of auctions by sellers in Stage 1.
Our key findings can be summarized along two lines. First, we show that when bidders may choose between entering the FPA or the SPA, the number of bidders entering each mechanism depends on the degree of absolute risk aversion. If bidders exhibit risk neutrality or CARA, they will enter each auction with equal probability. If bidders exhibit DARA, however, more bidders will enter the SPA, whereas if bidders exhibit IARA more bidders will enter the FPA. Second, by using the outcomes of the entry decision stage, we find that a monopolist prefers to sell both items in two simultaneous FPAs. We further find that, when bidders exhibit CARA or IARA, both sellers in a duopoly have a dominant strategy to select FPA. These findings also imply that DARA is a necessary condition for any other equilibrium (e.g. both sellers selecting SPA or one selecting FPA and the other selecting SPA) to exist. However, we demonstrate by example that when bidders exhibit DARA and values are uniformly distributed, offering FPA is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In general, our findings are consistent with the traditional revenue ranking theorems. That is, sellers seem to prefer to offer FPAs. These results, however, seem less consistent with practice in online auctions. On the Internet many different selling mechanisms are offered simultaneously-sometimes even by a single seller-and there seems to be a preference for SPAs (or the strategically equivalent English auction). Our findings suggest that auction versioning by monopolists, cannot be explained on the basis of expected-utility maximization with homogeneously risk neutral and risk averse bidders. Future research might consider heterogeneous risk averse (and risk seeking) bidders or take into account behavioral assumptions such as reference-dependent preferences and competitiveness. Taking into account more sophisticated assumptions might better explain bidders' entry decisions and, hence, the form that auction versioning takes.
A. Appendix A Lemma A1. E[U(q, r, m 1 )] is continuous and monotonically decreasing in q for a given r.
Lemma A1 directly follows from Pevnitskaya (2004) .
Lemma A2. E[U(q, r, m 2 )] is continuous and monotonically increasing in q for a given r.
Proof. This proof follows the same line of reasoning as the proof of Lemma A1 (Pevnitskaya, 2004) . For a given risk parameter, r, among N elements of the sum only the expression (1 − q * ) n 2 −1 (q * ) N−n 2 is a function of q. Since it is continuous in q, then the sum of N elements each of whom is continuous in q, is continuous as well. To show that E[U(q, r, m 2 )] is increasing in q for a given r, we only need to prove that
From the binomial density function properties we know that p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 1 ) > p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 2 ) for small n 2 , and vice versa for large n 2 . Therefore, there exists some m, such that [p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 1 ) − p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 2 )]x n 2 ≥ 0 for any n 2 ≤ m, and [p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 1 ) − p n 2 −1:N−1 (q 2 )]x n 2 < 0 for any n 2 > m.
To prove by contradiction, assume that
Since x n 2 is decreasing in n 2 , we further have
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the assumption does not hold and Lemma A2 is proven.
Lemma A3. R FPA is continuous and monotonically increasing in q for a given r.
Proof. For a given risk parameter, r, among N elements of the sum only the expression (q * ) n 1 (1 − q * ) N−n 1 is a function of q. Since it is continuous in q, then the sum of N elements each of whom is continuous in q, is continuous as well. To show that R FPA is increasing in q for a given r, we only need to prove that
From the binomial density function properties we know that p n 1 :N (q 1 ) < p n 1 :N (q 2 ) for small n 1 , and vice versa for large n 1 . Therefore, there exists some m, such that [p n 1 :N (q 1 ) − p n 1 :N (q 2 )]B FPA (n 1 , r) ≤ 0 for any n 1 ≤ m, and [p n 1 :N (q 1 ) − p n 1 :N (q 2 )]B FPA (n 1 , r) > 0 for any n 1 > m.
Then it follows that
Since B FPA (n 1 , r) is nondecreasing in n 1 , we further have
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the assumption does not hold and Lemma A3 is proven.
Lemma A4. R SPA is continuous and monotonically decreasing in q for a given r.
Proof. For a given risk parameter, r, among N elements of the sum only the expression (1 − q * ) n 2 (q * ) N−n 2 is a function of q. Since it is continuous in q, then the sum of N elements each of whom is continuous in q, is continuous as well. To show that R SPA is increasing in q for a given r, we only need to prove that
[p n 2 :N (q 1 ) − p n 2 :N (q 2 )]B SPA (n 2 ) < 0 f or q 1 > q 2
From the binomial density function properties we know that p n 2 :N (q 1 ) > p n 2 :N (q 2 ) for small n 2 , and vice versa for large n 2 . Therefore, there exists some m, such that [p n 2 :N (q 1 ) − p n 2 :N (q 2 )]B SPA (n 2 ) ≥ 0 for any n 2 ≤ m, and [p n 2 :N (q 1 ) − p n 2 :N (q 2 )]B SPA (n 2 ) > 0 for any n 2 > m.
To prove by contradiction, assume that 1 > 1 which is a contradiction. Therefore, the assumption does not hold and Lemma A4 is proven.
B. Appendix B
Suppose values are uniformly distributed between [0, v] and bidders maximize the same utility function U = y (1−r) , where y represents a bidder's payoff and r ∈ [0, 1) represents the constant relative risk aversion coefficient.
B.1. First price auction with CRRA bidders
The linear equilibrium bidding function for FPA is then given by:
The expected utility of FPA is given by: 
We can show that this is also true for n i = 1. Suppose that if n i = 1, the expected payoffs of winning are v 1−r . Then the expected utility of participating in the auction becomes (n i + 1) − n i n i (n i + 1) v n i +1 = n i − 1 n i + 1 v
